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What went wrong with liberal
multiculturalism?
RAINER BAUBÖCK
European University Institute, Italy
In contrast with other contributions to this review symposium, I share Will
Kymlicka’s assessment of the virtues of liberal multiculturalism and his
desire to further elaborate its repertoire so that it may become acceptable
and applicable under conditions that are radically different from, and much
less favourable than, those prevailing in western democracies.
In his new book, Kymlicka suggests that, after strongly promoting liberal
multiculturalism in the 1990s, international law and international organiz-
ations are now caught in an impasse and likely to retreat. I am not sure that
this diagnosis is correct. Multiculturalism is certainly under attack in
Europe, but may still be alive and kicking under different names in other
parts of the world. The adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples shortly after publication of Kymlicka’s book – albeit in
a watered-down version – suggests at least that progress on some fronts is
still possible. However, there is certainly a strong sense of doubt about the
task description, and chances of success for international efforts to promote
liberal solutions to multicultural conflicts seem to have become dimmer.
I see three possible diagnoses for the current malaise. The first one is that
this is as good as it gets. The international communities’ commitment to
multiculturalism may have been genuine, insofar as it has been perceived
as a natural extension of the human rights agenda and as a means to defuse
dangerous ethno-national conflicts, but it has now reached its limits. After
all, international organizations operate within the normative framework of
the Westphalian state system and are committed to maintaining this frame-
work. Where liberal multiculturalism is seen to conflict with its normative
foundations, it has to give way.
The second diagnosis is that we are witnessing a real backlash. Maybe
the international community’s commitment was not genuine but merely
conditional. Multiculturalism was supported insofar as it was seen to
contribute to the more fundamental goals of peace, democracy and
development. Now there are doubts, nourished by an increasing number of
public intellectuals, not only about exporting multicultural solutions to
post-communist and developing countries, but also about their effects on
social solidarity, gender equality and overall societal cohesion in western
democracies.
A third diagnosis focuses instead on the justification of liberal multi-
culturalism. It responds to the second one that there may be less wrong with
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the actual policies of multiculturalism than with some of their ideological
underpinnings. It would certainly be naive to suggest that the lack of good
theories is a major cause of political retreat. Real-world obstacles are well
identified in Kymlicka’s book, and my first and second diagnoses are
probably both part of a fuller explanation. But in order to build a case
against retreat, it may not be enough to take into account non-western
contexts, to add more specific instruments that target different types of
claims, and to adopt a strategy of sequencing cultural rights, as Kymlicka
suggests in the concluding chapter of his book. We also need a more
coherent defence of multiculturalism that resonates with the most progress-
ive aspects of international law. This is anyway all that academics committed
to liberal multiculturalism can do.
The problem I see with Kymlicka’s defence of liberal multiculturalism is
that it remains too strongly rooted in a culturalist version of liberal nation-
alism. Liberal nationalism shares with all other kinds of nationalism the
view that, ideally, political and cultural boundaries should coincide. What
makes liberal nationalism liberal are two further ideas. First, belonging to
a national community is not an intrinsic value, but an instrumental one.1 It
is important for individual autonomy and well-being (Tamir, 1993,
Kymlicka, 1995) or for social justice and solidarity among citizens (Miller,
1995). Second, since all individuals have equal rights to autonomy and
well-being or to citizenship in a democratic state, the communities to which
they are affiliated must also be treated equally. It follows that every nation
has the same claim to self-determination and that minorities have rights to
protect their culture against dominant majorities through pursuing their
own projects of nation building.
This theoretical framework cannot be fully shared by international
organizations and lawyers. An equal right to self-determination for all
nations would immediately conflict with the basic Westphalian norm of
territorial integrity of states. International law does, however, support a
principle of ‘self-determination of peoples’. In order to reconcile this with
the territorial integrity of states, ‘peoples’ have been defined more narrowly
than ‘nations’ (Cassese, 1995).
Unlike normative theorists, international lawyers do not have to build
coherent theories, but interpret norms they find in treaties and evolving
state practices. The break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has led to
new interpretations of self-determination, but there is still wide agreement
that it does not entail a right of stateless nations to secession and indepen-
dence. Theories of multiculturalism that appear to endorse such rights will
be looked at suspiciously by most international organizations and lawyers.
This may explain their reluctance to go any further that I associate with the
first diagnosis above.
Kymlicka is not very explicit on this point. He is aware that international
organizations have strong security concerns about threats to territorial
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integrity, but it is less clear whether he thinks that liberal justice requires a
right of nations to self-determination. In his view, national majorities have
to grant demands for minority self-government as a matter of justice, but
he does not seem to support analogous obligations of minorities who have
been granted strong autonomy to respect the territorial integrity of multi-
national democracies (see Kymlicka, 2001: Ch. 5). Ambiguity on this point
may, however, be fatal for a theory that aims to inform a morally coherent
and politically sustainable approach to minority rights in international law.
Kymlicka is right that there is a huge gap in the current ‘generic rights’
stream of international law between, on the one hand, the universal cultural
rights of Art. 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and, on the other hand, the right of self-determination of peoples
proclaimed by the UN Charter and both UN human rights conventions. Yet
adding targeted self-government rights for specific kinds of minorities
would not address the deeper cause of the problem, which is the irreconcil-
able tension between self-determination and territorial integrity. As long as
self-determination remains there as the ultimate prize, many minority
nationalists will regard rights to territorial autonomy as only a first step,
while most governments will see them as one step too far. What we need
instead are normative principles for accommodating rival claims that
support equilibrium solutions (Laitin, 2007).
As I have suggested elsewhere, this would require abandoning self-
determination as a general principle and promoting instead a general right
to self-government that applies to existing states as well as to historic sub-
state political communities, and even to transnational modes of citizenship
that link migrants and diaspora communities with an external ‘homeland’
(Bauböck, 2006). A principle of unilateral self-determination is not univer-
salizable, whereas a principle of self-government can be applied universally
as long as all rights-holders are required to accommodate rival claims by
accepting nested and overlapping political jurisdictions. I am perfectly
aware that this proposal entails a quite radical departure from current inter-
national law since it challenges the current equation between sovereign
states and self-governing political communities. But it seems to me a more
coherent answer than liberal nationalism can provide to the question of
how tensions between security and justice can be reduced through
strengthening progressive principles in international law (see also
Buchanan, 2004).
My second critique concerns the culturalist foundations of Kymlicka’s
approach. As he has explained in his earlier work, Kymlicka thinks that
liberals ought to value membership in a cultural community not as an object
of individual choice, but as a background that makes other choices in one’s
life meaningful. A background culture that enables individuals to be
autonomous must generally be ‘an intergenerational community, more or
less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland,
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sharing a distinct language and history (Kymlicka, 1995: 14), in other words,
a nation. This core element of Kymlicka’s theory has been criticized both
from sociological and normative perspectives. The latter critique points
out that opportunities for individual autonomy may be greater where the
background culture is itself multicultural and where individuals are seen to
belong to several cultures simultaneously (Waldron 1996). The former
critics have accused Kymlicka of reifying national cultures that are them-
selves constantly in flux and constructed by government institutions and
ethnic entrepreneurs in order to gain popular support for their claims
(Brubaker, 2004).
I cannot engage here with the substance of these charges, but I think they
do touch a weak spot when it comes to promoting liberal multiculturalism
in the international arena and to defending it against critics in domestic
ones. Kymlicka’s culturalist justification for minority rights is at odds with
the normative foundations of modern human rights law and raises there-
fore suspicions among progressive international lawyers. The hard core of
minority rights in international law is not grounded in values of either
cultural diversity or cultural belonging, but in individual liberty and equality
and assumptions about ‘standard threats’ to these values in modern states
and societies. One good reason why international law does not, and should
not, refer more explicitly to the value of cultural membership is that there
is little hope to find consensus on what this value might be and what it
entails for state duties of cultural protection.
Instead of taking the detour via the value of cultural membership, it
seems to me much more promising to refer directly to three basic values of
international human rights law. These are: liberty, equality and self-govern-
ment. Article 27 ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights) rights of minorities ‘to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practise their own religion, or to use their own language’ can be easily
defended on grounds of liberty of thought, speech and association. The core
principle of non-discrimination in human rights law can support more far-
reaching duties of governments to provide protection to individuals and to
ensure that cultural membership does not become a disadvantage in access
to other basic public goods and resources. A more comprehensive notion
of equality can also support exemptions from certain public laws for
religious minorities or claims to symbolic recognition and material support
for minorities, but these kinds of cultural rights are difficult to generalize
across contexts and need to be negotiated in democratic settings.
For the rights that I have listed so far, invoking a cultural justification
may not be the best strategy to defend them, but it makes little difference
with regard to the outcome. The question becomes really important only in
specifying the third value of self-government. If international law attributed
a right to self-government to specific groups on the basis of their cultural
characteristics then it would directly contribute to the reification of group
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identities and would provide incentives for nationalist entrepreneurs as well
as for national governments to prove their claims through strategies of
cultural homogenization.
The main deficit in the current normative framework of international law
is that there is no coherent answer to the question of how to resolve
conflicts over which territory belongs to which jurisdiction and which politi-
cal community individuals ought to be citizens of. These boundary issues
would become even more difficult to address once we mix them with claims
to cultural protection, cultural homelands and cultural membership. The
alternative answer of sticking simply to the value of equality is not helpful
either, since it presupposes an answer to the question: equality among
whom? The boundaries of political communities must be settled first before
we can develop a full account of equality among those who are rightfully
subjected to a particular jurisdiction.
What can be done by international law and international organizations
in answering these boundary questions? My hunch is that we do need
general principles for the settlement of territorial conflict and for allocat-
ing citizens to specific political communities at sub-state, state, and supra-
state levels. However, in order to be sufficiently universal, these principles
must remain fairly general. One cannot and should not specify in advance
the cultural characteristics of groups that can claim self-government rights.
Ultimately, devolving self-government powers to territorial sub-units is a
matter of constitutional settlements within particular polities. Negotiating
these rights in democratic deliberations is the only way for how they can be
specified. In such negotiations, each side has to show that it has a demo-
cratic mandate for its claims. And working out arrangements of nested self-
government in such a setting will in turn strengthen commitment to
democracy among all parties involved (Laitin, 2007: Ch. 5).
Where the preconditions for such negotiated settlements are absent or
where negotiations fail and break down into violent conflict, the inter-
national community may have to mediate or intervene. But the modes of
self-government that can keep together deeply diverse polities must ulti-
mately be worked out by these societies themselves. Social scientists can
compare solutions that have worked and specify the conditions under which
they have worked and political theorists can elaborate the normative
principles that ought to be accepted by all involved in such conflicts. But
ultimately, it is for citizens and their representatives to work out how to
distribute self-government power across political communities whose
territories and membership overlap with each other.
Kymlicka’s account of liberal multiculturalism in the international arena
remains torn between the foundations of his normative theory and realistic
insights into the limitations of international law. This tension cannot be fully
resolved, but it could be alleviated by shedding some of the culturalist and
nationalist baggage of the theory.
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Notes
1 Jonathan Glover has stated this nicely as a variation on Kant’s categorical
imperative: ‘Always treat nations merely as means and never as ends in them-
selves’ (Glover, 1997: 29).
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